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BARGAINING POWER
It has often been observed that the
farmer generally has to take the price he
can get when he markets his produce, but
is usually required to pay the price
"set" for the goods he buys in the gro
cery store. From this comes the theorem
that the one who can control the price
has bargaining power while the other does
not. It is also assumed, therefore, that
the price will be higher with this "bar
gaining power" than it would be otherwise.
Bargaining is the process of buyers
and sellers attempting to get together to
determine a "price" for the exchange of
goods or services. If there can be any
coercion--such as the use of force or the
fact that one is a single seller of the
good much in need by the other--then one
of them has more "power" than the other.
Except in extremely rare cases, however,
does he have absolute power. There are
usually substitutes that will be accept
able, or there are limits to what the
buyer can pay out of a limited income, or
how little the seller will take before he
decides not to trade.
The buyer may be an intermediate buy
er, buying not for his own use but for
resale to someone else. In this case, he
must know about what price the final buy
er will pay and how many he will take at
that price. Generally, a buyer is able
and willing to buy more at a low price
than he is at a higher price, while the
supplier will be willing to supply more
at a high price than at a low price. In
the long run, the price where the buyers
and sellers finally agree to trade will
tend to be close to that price at which
buyers will take all that is offered and
sellers will sell all they have. A price
higher than this will discourage some of
the demand for the goods but encourage
producers to produce a little more.
Eventually, the price must fall or pro
duction must be curtailed as stocks of
unsold goods build up.
To get bargaining power (using the
supply side as an example), there must be
a limited number of sellers or most sel
lers must be acting as a single seller.
Any seller who is large enough in the in
dustry to supply any sizeable portion of
the market will drain away the bargaining
power of the others if he is willing to
sell for less than the rest. It should be
pointed out, however, that a limited num
ber of sellers does not by itself mean
that there is not competition among the
sellers themselves.
The most powerful selling situation
would be one in which there were only one
seller of the product, and if possible,
there should either be no substitutes or
the sellers should also be the sole sup
plier of the substitutes, too. Almost
any commodity, however, has some substi
tutes or soon will have if the price is
forced high enough to encourage the pro
duction of substitutes--margarine, synthe
tic milk, foods "grown" in laboratories,
gasoline, synthetic diamonds are examples.
Thus even a pure monopolist ( if there
were one) would have to be concerned with
setting the price too high.
The single seller has a choice; he
can set either the price or the amount he
wishes to sell. When he has decided on
one of them, the other is automatically
determined even though it may not be pre
cisely known. Since he must be prepared
to limit the amounts coming to market,
he must be prepared to own and to store
any excess goods. If the buyers are
aware that there are large amounts stored,
it will influence the price the buyers
will be willing to pay today since they
may anticipate lower prices later. This
is particularly true if the product is
perishable or costly to keep in storage.
To maintain a price then, it is best if
production is held to the amounts that
are expected to be taken at that price.
Limiting production poses many pro
blems if there are several sellers. But
for the bargaining power to be maintained,
it is essential that all or most of the
present sellers conform and that limita
tions on entry of new suppliers be esta
blished or that new entrants be given a
share of the total production, thereby
reducing the share of the others.
Basically, bargaining power in an or
ganized society comes from the legal
framework of government. The government
can give bargaining power in a number of
ways. It can prevent one party from
having as much power as it might have by
encouraging competition and limiting
monopoly power, thus in effect putting
one at less of a disadvantage than it
might otherwise be. Or it can permit one
party to increase its power by legisla
tion that allows more freedom to band to
gether to buy or sell than it allows in
other fields. The government can itself
supply much bargaining power for one party
by offering to buy, or sell, at estab
lished prices. It does this in effect
with price-support operations in which it
stands ready to buy with taxpayer money
any part of the product that cannot be
put into the hands of consumers at the
minimum prices announced.
Import duties and restrictions and ex
porting activities are other examples of
government efforts that either directly or
indirectly influence the bargaining posi
tion of buyers and sellers. Foreign-made
products easily come into competition with
locally made ones when the price gets high
enough, and conversely, high-priced dome
stic products do not move easily into for
eign markets. Efforts to maintain a high
price on domestic production can thus us
ually be effective only if the government
is willing to keep out or limit foreign
competition.
Within the last two years, the farmer
has gained much bargaining power through a
series of events which as seen him re
ceive much higher prices and some widely
fluctuating ones as well. Large increases
in sales abroad, due partly to Russia's
large wheat purchases but also devalua
tions of the American dollar, which can
now buy more of our meat and other foods,
have increased demand. The threat of
lower prices that result from large gov
ernment stocks no longer hangs over the
marketplace since most of them have been
liquidated. The higher prices for feeds
have reduced the incentive for cattle and
hog feeders to produce, resulting in less
meat available. Coupled with the American
housewive's reluctance to give up any more
meat than she has to, and the tendency of
substitutes' prices to rise at the same
time, tends to keep meat prices up. The
varying reports of new crop production and
potential sales also combine to keep
prices fluctuating.
Robert J. Antonides--Extension Economist'
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